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INTRODUCTION

This essay is part of a continuing effort to identify potential problem
areas that the drafters of the U.N. Convention on Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment' failed to
anticipate. The intention is to confront and resolve legal ambiguities
which could be utilized by States to circumvent their obligations as
signatories to the Convention.
The determination of the illegality of the actions or omissions by
States Parties of the Convention, on the international plane by the
Committee established under the Convention or by an Arbitral Tribunal in the settlement of disputes between the parties, depends upon
whether they fall within the scope of the prohibited conduct in the
Convention. Article 1 of the Convention, which defines the proscribed
conduct, therefore, is extremely important and deserves careful
analysis.
There can be no breach of the Convention for conduct considered
to be outside the scope of its prohibition. To successfully accomplish
the Convention's objectives and purposes - the reasonable prevention
of torture - requires not only that the States Parties abstain from
the practice of torture as an official policy, but also, that they enact
such legislative, administrative, and judicial measures to prevent such
human rights violations.
By clarifying and eliminating the deficiencies that exist in Article
1 of the Convention, it will be far more difficult for State Parties to
justify torture, or to rationalize their failure to prevent it. Moreover,
the Convention, properly clarified, may prove to be a deterrent to
States in the practice of torture, and to promote the authentic attainment of the Convention's goals. Hopefully, the work will contribute
to this end by persuading the States Parties to provide more humane
treatment for their citizens, refraining from the practice of torture

1. A. BOULESBAA, An Analysis of the 1984 Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 4 DICK. J. INT'L L. 185 (1986); The
Nature of the ObligationIncurred by States under Article 2 of the U.N. Convention Against
Torture, Hum. Rts. Q., Vol. 12, at 53 (1990).
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and other gross violations of human rights. The process of clarification
and elimination of the deficiencies of Article 1 entails analyzing the
legislative history of the Article, the general principles of both common
and civil law, as well as international law.
II.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITED CONDUCT

A.

The Definition of Torture

Article 1 reads:
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act
he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person,
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental
to lawful sanctions.
2. This Article is without prejudice to any international
instrument or national legislation which does not or may
contain provisions of wider application.
B.

The Origins and Evolution of Article 1

The introductory analysis in this section will deal primarily with
the origins and evolutions of the Article. The substantive debate from
the formative stages of the Convention's drafting will be in the sections
dealing with the commentary on the wording of the Article.
In 1978, at the thirty-fourth session of the Working Group on the
Convention on Torture of the Commission on Human Rights, Sweden
and the International Association of Penal Law introduced different
draft Conventions2 for consideration. The Group agreed to conduct its
debate on the basis of the provisions of the Swedish draft with the
understanding that no articles would be adopted at this session. As
the proposal of the International Association of Penal Law did not

2. For the original Swedish Draft Convention, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1285 (1978). See also
Draft Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO.213
(1978) (introduced by the International Association of Penal Law).
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receive favorable support from the Working Group, the Swedish text
was sent to the Governments of Member States for their comments
3
and suggestions.
Article 1 of the Swedish draft, which was borrowed from Article
1 of the 1975 U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From
Being Subjected to Torture, reads:
1. For the purpose of the present Convention, torture
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the
instigation of public official on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other
persons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to the
extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners.
2. Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish4
ment.
For some delegations this draft represented an acceptable basis
for further discussions. Reasoning that the Convention was to be a
legally binding instrument and required more precision, others took
the view that the definition in the Swedish draft was vague and needed
5
to be clarified.
Concerning the scope of paragraph 2 of Article 1 of this draft, the
debate focused on the conceptual relationship between "inhuman treatment" and "torture." The central issue was whether the Convention
should cover only "acts of torture," or also "other acts of cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment" that fall short of the infliction
of severe physical or mental pain as defined in paragraph 1. Many
representatives took the position that the scope of Article 1(2) should
be limited to acts of torture. They argued that the concept of "other

3. See The Report of the 1978 Working Group on the Draft Convention on Torture, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/L. 1400, at 30 (1978).
4. See The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Res. No. 3452 (Dec. 9,
1975), 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976).
5. The Report of the 1978 Working Group on the Draft Convention on Torture, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/L. 1400, at 30 (1978).
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inhuman treatment" cannot be defined in terms favorable to all countries and legal systems.
The Comments of States in support of or against this paragraph
were equally divided. 6 Some States took the position that the definition
should be limited only to acts of torture. Others were in favor of the
wording of the paragraph and the inclusion of the concept of "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." The USSR and the
German Democratic Republic represent the former position. The
United States and the Swiss government represent the latter. The
USSR argaed that the concept of "torture" and that of "cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment," should be treated as legally
distinct. As far as it was concerned, the institution of punishment is
an acceptable part of the legal system of States and its application to
offenders is a common practice by all States. In the USSR's opinion
the Convention required a clear distinction between punishments that
can be justly applied to offenders, and forms of treatment or punishment which, because of their cruel, inhuman or particularly degrading
nature, cannot be applied. The German Democratic Republic objected
to the inclusion of the concept in the paragraph, on the premise
that
7
there is no criteria by which the concept can be defined.
The Swiss government took the view that the definition should
extend to both acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and proposed an amendment to paragraph 2 of
Article 1.8 The United States agreed that it is not possible to draw
a sharp line between acts of torture and other lesser forms of acts of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, reasoning that
torture is merely the most extreme form of such acts.9
At the pre-sessional discussions prior to the thirty-fifth session of
the Working Group, Sweden submitted a revised draft Convention
based on the Comments of States.1
6. See The Summary Prepared by the Secretary-Generalin Accordance with Commission
Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314, at 7-8 (1978) (containing the comments
received from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture, Commission
on Human Rights).
7. Id. at 7.
8. The Swiss Amendment reads: The term 'torture' includes "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."
9. See The Summary Prepared by the Secretary-Generalin Accordance with Commission
Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314, at 5 (1978) (containing the comments
received from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture, Commission

on Human Rights).
10. The comments of States were made in accordance with Resolution 18 (XXXIV) of the
Commission on Human Rights which invited the Members of the U.N. to comment on the
Swedish Draft Convention of 1978. See Draft Convention on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
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Article 1 of the revised version reads:
1. For any purpose of the present Convention, torture
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person by
or at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he has
committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating
or coercing him or other persons, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.
2. This Article is without prejudice to any international
instrument or national legislation which does not or may
establish wider prohibition.1"
The draft broadened the scope of the Convention to include acts
committed with the consent or the acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity in accordance with the definition of torture suggested by some States. It also added to the list
of the purposes of torture, coercion and the infliction of pain or suffering based on discrimination of any kind. However, this draft Article
omitted the reference to the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, and the entire second paragraph of the original
draft. The above draft was debated, but no agreement could be reached
on its provisions. Their differences on this draft were as great as on
the previous one.

or DegradingTreatment or Punishment: Report of Commission on Human Rights, Res. No. 18
(XXXIV) (1978). In that resolution, the Commission had made a recommendation to the Economic
and Social Council to the effect that it authorize the holding of a meeting of a Working Group,
open to all members of the Commission on Human Rights for one week prior to the thirty-fifth
session of the Commission with the task of preparing concrete drafting proposals for the Commission on the basis of the relevant document of its thirty-fourth session and any comments
received from governments. Report of Commission on Human Rights, 34 U.N. ESCOR Supp.
(No.4) at 121, U.N. Doc. E/1978/34 (1978). This resolution is the product of the Revised Draft
Resolution submitted by Sweden in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.1400 (1978).
11. See The Revised Draft Convention submitted by Sweden, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/WG.1/WP. 1
(1979); see also J. BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 208 App. 7 (1988).
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In an effort to find a compromise formula acceptable to Members
of the Working Group, Sweden resubmitted the following revised draft
12
Article:
1. For the purpose of this Convention, torture means
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.
2. Torture is an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
3. This Article is without prejudice to any international
instrument or national legislation which does or may contain
provision of wider application relating to the subject matter
of this Convention.
This version of the Revised Swedish Draft was found to be acceptable to most delegates and thus Paragraphs 1 and 3 of this draft were
adopted by consensus. But with regard to paragraph 2, the Working
Group had decided to postpone its consideration to the later sessions.
At its thirty-seventh session, the Working Group resumed its consideration of paragraph 2 of Article 1. In this session some representatives supported the paragraph. Others opposed it on the grounds
that the wording of the paragraph could be seen as bringing an element
of imprecision to the definition of torture 13 in paragraph 1. Since no
consensus was reached on the adoption of the paragraph, the Working
Group decided to defer its consideration to the next session.
At its thirty-eighth session, the Working Group reopened the discussion on the paragraph. There was, however, no change in the
position of the delegations. The proponents of the paragraph insisted
that the paragraph was necessary for the purposes of their domestic

12. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1347, at 38-39 (1979).
13. See The Report of the 1981 Working Group, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L. 1576 (1981); Report
of Commission on Human Rights, 37 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 50, U.N. Doc. E/1981/25
(1981); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1475, at 52 (1981).
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criminal law because it clarified the definition of torture in a concise
manner. Its opponents argued that there was no universally accepted
concept of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and
therefore, it was inappropriate to include it in the Convention.14
The debate on this matter was then shifted to Article 16, paragraph
1, which led to the solution of the problem. As a result of the debate
on this Article and the incorporation of new language in its first paragraph (similar to the one contained in paragraph 2 of Article 1), the
Working Group decided to delete the paragraph. Thus, paragraph 3
of Article 1 became Number 2 in the present Article of the Convention.
III.

COMMENT AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION

As Article 1 defines the subject matter of the Convention, its
operative premise consists of the Article's four legal aspects: (1) the
conduct; (2) the intention of the offender and the purpose of the conduct; (3) the identity of the offender; and (4) the exclusions.
A.

The Nature of the Conduct

The proscribed conduct is defined as "any act by which severe pain
or suffering whether physical or mental . ...
1. Act

In the drafting stage, no difficulty was encountered with this
phrase, for as an act of commission, its meaning is unambiguous. The
question arises, however, in contrast with an act, because torture can
occur as a result of an omission. For example, while the use of a
thumbscrew is clearly an act, is the failure to provide food, water or
medical attention to be regarded as a prohibited act?
There is no reference to this question at any stage of the preparatory work of the Convention. Thus, the search for the answer to this
question must be sought in the principles of the major legal systems
and, in the light of international treaties. Under the civil law system,
the word "act" is often interpreted to cover an "omission." The word
"human act" (fait de l'homme) in Article 1382 of the French Civil
Code,' 5 which laid down the legal norms of delictual liability, has been
interpreted to include "omission. '' 16 But under other legal systems,
14.

See The Report of the 1982 Working Group, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982 L/40 (1982) (text

is reproduced in an addendum, U.N. Doc. E/1982/12/Add. 1, at 3 (1982).
15. Article 1382 states "Any human act (fait de l'homme) which causes damage to another
obligates the person through whose fault the damage occurred to make reparation for the
damage."
16. See F. MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 577 (1977).
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exemplified by the common law, there is no liability for negligent
omissions unless there is a legal duty to act. 17 French law, however,
is very liberal and goes so far as to require the rescue of others"1
even without the requirement of any explicit legal connection triggering the duty to act as may be needed under the Anglo-American law.
Under the French law, like that of many other systems of law, the
deliberate omission of rescue action will invariably entail criminal liability 9 because the elements of criminal liability are: act, intent and
causation. Thus under this system of law an "omission" is an "act."
Anglo-American criminal law basically functions similarly to the
French law, at least as clarified in the Model Penal Code 2° of the
United States. It defines the term conduct as an "act" or an "omission,"
and the U.S. courts have held that "conduct resulting in death" may
take the form of act or omission. 2 1 Accordingly, American and English
law has evolved toward recognition of liability as a result of the failure
to act (omission) for an offense defined in terms of commission (act).2
For instance, a parent may be held liable for criminal homicide if the
death of a child is caused by parental failure (omission) to provide
food23 and medical treatment2 even though the offense of homicide is
defined in terms of commission.25

17.
18.

Id. at 581.
Article 63 of the Penal Code of April 13, 1954 states:
Without prejudice to the application in a proper case of severer penalties prescribed
by the present Code and by special laws, anyone who could, by his prompt action,
without risk to himself or to third persons, prevent either a crime or a delict
against the bodily security of a person, and who wilfully abstains from so acting,
shall be punishable by imprisonment of from three months to five years and by
fine from 360 F to 15,000 F, or by one only of these penalties.
19. Id.
20. Model Penal Code § 1.13(5) states that "in this Code, unless a different meaning plainly
is required: 'conduct' means an action or omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where
relevant, a series of acts and omissions." See Model Penal Code Official Draft and Explanatory
Notes: Complete Text of Model Penal Code as Adopted at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the
American Law Institute at Washington, D.C., May 1962, The American Law Institute (1985).
21. See Eichner v. Dillion, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
22. Robinson, Criminal Liability for Omissions: A Brief Summary and Critique of the
Law in the United States, 29 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 102 (1984). See generally Shuman, Act and
Omission in Criminal Law: Towards a Nonsubjective Theory, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 16 (1964).
23. See People v. Lynch, 47 Mich. App. 8, 208 N.W.2d 656 (1973); State v. Crawford, 188
Neb. 378, 196 N.W.2d 915 (1972); R. v. Instan, [1983] 1 Q.B. at 453-54.
24. See Eaglen v. State, 249 Ind. 144, 231 N.E.2d 147 (1967); State v. Williams, 4 Wash.
App. 908, 483 P.2d 1167 (1971); R. v. Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283; [1895-99] All E.R. Rep. 511;
R. v. Lowe, [1973] 1 All E.R. 805.
25. The states of the jurisdictions where the above American cases were decided define
murder in the active rather than passive tense, i.e. murder is an unlawful killing. See IND.
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The Anglo-American law, however, like that of the civil law regards
an "omission" as an "act" only where the legal duty 26 to act is specifically required by law. 27For example, this system of law imposed the
legal duty to act in about four situations: first, where a statute imposes
a duty to care for another;- second, where one stands in a certain
status relationship to another;2 third, where one has assumed a contractual duty to care for another;-° finally, where one has voluntarily
assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as
to prevent others from rendering aid.31
On the other hand, under the concepts of liability as adopted by
the legal systems of the majority of States in the world, the failure
to provide food, water and medical help to someone to whom one owes
no legal duty (as by virtue of a parental relation) is not an omission.
With respect to the issue addressed above, this concession raises the
question of whether, on a larger scale, States are under the legal
obligation to provide these necessities of life, or, by contrast, does
their "omission" to do so constitute an "act" that falls comparably

§ 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1979); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.548 (Callaghan 1982); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28.302 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.010 (1977).
26. In R. v. Instan the Court states that: "It would not be correct to say that every moral
obligation involves a legal duty; but every legal duty is founded on moral obligation." 1 Q.B.
453-54.
27. See People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 214, 113 N.W. 1131 (1907). The deceased voluntarily
consumed alcohol and morphine during an assignation with the defendant at his home. The
prosecution charged the defendant with manslaughter on the theory that, as the woman was
in his house, the defendant "stood towards this woman for the time being in the place of her
natural guardian and protector, and as such owed her a clear legal duty which he completely
failed to perform." On appeal, the court rejected this argument stating that to convict an
individual for his failure to act, there must be a duty imposed by law or contract. The MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.01(3)(b), which governs this question, provides that "Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless a duty to
perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law."
28. See, e.g. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-902 (1981); Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684
(1959).
29. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa. C. 56 (1915) (father guilty of involuntary
manslaughter of five-year-old son having failed to obtain needed medical treatment); Rex v.
Chattaway, 17 Crim. App. 7 (1922) (parents guilty of manslaughter of 25-year-old daughter who
became helpless because parents withheld nourishment); Rex v. Gibbings & Proctor, 13 Crim.
App. 134 (1918) (father and mistress guilty of murder where the mistress accepted charge of,
and the father provided care for, a child who, nevertheless, died from neglect).
30. See, e.g., People v. Montecino, 66 Cal. App. 2d 85, 152 P.2d 5 (1944) (the defendant,
under contractual duty to care for elderly woman, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter
for failing to perform his contractual duty).
31. See Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
CODE ANN.
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within the scope of Article 1 of the Convention on Torture. This issue
must be dealt with in both its narrow and broad meaning.
In the narrow meaning of the question, a State which incarcerates
an individual is obliged to provide him with food, water and medical
care, not by virtue of prescriptive laws, but by virtue of the detainee's
humanity. In the broad sense of the question, the issue must be viewed
in the light of the norms and principles of international law. The rights
to food 32 and to freedom from hunger 33 have been recognized in many
international human rights instruments 34 and the States Parties to
these instruments are legally bound to implement the necessary steps
progressively to achieve the realization of these rights. Article 11 of
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which has
been accepted by the majority of States Members of the U.N., reads:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect
the essential importance of international co-operation based
on free consent.

32.

For a detailed analysis of the subject, see P.

ALSTON &

K.

TOMASEVSKI, THE RIGHT

TO FOOD (1984).

33. Article 1 of G.A. Resolution 3180 (XXVIII) of 1974 on the Declaration on the Eradication
of Hunger and Malnutrition states:
1. Every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger
and malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain their physical and mental
faculties. Society today already possesses sufficient resources, organizational ability
and technology and hence the competence to achieve this objective. Accordingly,
the eradication of hunger is a common objective of all the countries of the international community, especially of the developed countries and others in a position to
help.
34. The International Human Rights Instruments that specifically recognized the right are
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Article 25 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: "Everyone has the right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services.. . ." Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. 1/777 (1948). The last sentence of 2 of Art.
1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads: "In no case may a people
be deprived of its own subsistence." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
(adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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The Four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and the Two
Additional Protocols of June 10, 19773 which deal with the protection
of different victims in time of war and civil strife, are the core of the
present humanitarian law and have direct relevance and importance
to the issue at hand. The international instruments are intended to
regulate the conduct of States in these extreme situations in which
torture and other crimes against humanity are carried out on a large
scale causing untold sorrow to human beings. These conventions, including the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,impose a legal duty on States to provide food, water and medical
attention 37 and specifically prohibit the utilization of starvation as a

35. The First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, of August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362,
75 U.N.T.S. 31 (opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); The
Second Geneva Conventionfor the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No.
3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950);
The Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisonersof War, of Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); The
Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (opened for signature Aug.
12, 1949, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
Aug. 12, 1949, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977), 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (1978), 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977)
(opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) (relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts); Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949, U.N. Doc. No. A/32/144 (1977), 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 502 (1978), 16 I.L.M.
1442 (1977) (opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) (relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts).
36. Article 20 of these rules reads: "1. Every prisoner shall be provided by the administration
at the usual hours with food of nutritional value adequate for health and strength, of wholesome
quality and well prepared and served. 2. Drinking water shall be available to every prisoner
whenever he needs it."
37. Article 55 of the 4th Convention concerning the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War provides that: "To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power
has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular,
bring in the necessary food stuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the
occupied territory are inadequate." Article 26 of the 3rd Convention relating to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War provides that:
The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to
keep prisoners of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies. Accounts shall also be taken of the habitual diet
of the prisoners. The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who work
with such additional rations as are necessary for the labour on which they are
employed . . . . Collective disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited.
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means of warfare.1 The Geneva Conventions have been held to be a
restatement of the "general principles of international law,"39 which
have binding force on all States of the international community. Thus,
States are under the legal duty to act in this regard, and consequently,
their "omission" is an "act" that is in breach of international law.
However, whether the breach of international law by States in
this respect through "omission" is an "act" that falls within the scope
of Article 1 of the Convention on Torture, or is an "act" that falls
within the scope of the other conventions mentioned above, depends
on the purpose and the circumstances of the "omission." For instance,
the failure to provide food and medical care to the general population
as a result of the negligence or corruption of the Government involved
may well be a breach of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, but it would not qualify as an "act" of
torture. Under the two legal systems that have just been reviewed,
an "omission" is an "act" where there is a legal duty to act, and as
the legal duty of States to act in this respect has been established in
the previous international conventions, it would be absurd to conclude
that the prohibition of torture in the context of Article 1 does not
extend to conduct by way of omission.
To conclude that the prohibition of activity in this particular context
does not extend to conduct by way of "omission" is nothing less than
a ploy to help States evade the provisions of the Convention. Such a
conclusion is antithetical to the objects and purposes of the Convention,
and would result in their defeat by violating international law. According to that law, treaties are to be interpreted in the light of their
objects and purposes. 40 The object and purpose of the Convention on
Torture are the regulation and prohibition of all government conduct
that inflicts pain and suffering for the ends stated in Article 1, regardless of whether such conduct is affirmative or negative. The purpose
and effect of the conduct are the decisive elements in determining if
they constitute torture. Negative acts inflict as much physical and
mental harm as positive acts and achieve the same inhumane ends.

38. Both Articles 54(1) and 14 of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949 and of June 10, 1977 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International and
Non-International Armed Conflicts provide: "Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is
prohibited."
39. See Op. Com., Jan. 25, 1976, Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, Y.B. xX 790(1976).
40. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads: "A treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose," U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/27 (1969) (opened for signature May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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To conclude otherwise would also be inconsistent with the developing
awareness of the international community regarding the need to impose sanctions against States that attempt to evade the Convention.
Following this reasoning, the European Commission on Human Rights
has, in the case of Denmark v. Greece,41 held that, "The failure of the
Government of Greece to provide food, water, heating in winter,
proper washing facilities, clothing, medical and dental care to prisoners
constitutes an 'act' of torture in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR."
2.

Severe Physical or Mental Pain or Suffering
In this phrase the words "pain and suffering" are so clear and
understandable, especially when coupled with the words "physical or
mental" that they should not give rise to difficulties of interpretation.
The commentary on this phrase, therefore, will concentrate on the
other words which are susceptible to legal difficulties in interpreting
the Convention.
3.

Severe

During the evolution of the term, a number of proposals were
made for its deletion. However, all such proposals were defeated. The
proposal to delete the word during the drafting" of the U.N. Declaration on Torture of 1975, from which the Swedish Draft of 1978 was
borrowed, was rejected."
The same thing is true with respect to the USSR's proposal to
delete the word in the debates of the Third Committee on the Convention on Torture after the finalization of its drafting by the Working
Group of the Commission on Human Rights. 45 The insistence on the
word "severe" in the U.N. Declaration and in Article 1 of this Con-

41.

Op. Com., Nov. 5, 1969, Greek Case, YB XII 1 (1969).

42.

Id. at 461-505; P.

SIEGHART, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS

164 (1983).

43. The Declaration of the Protection of All Persons From Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, was drafted by the Fifth U.N.
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. The G.A. at its thirtieth
session, unanimously adopted the Declaration. However, it changed the word "principles" in
Article 2 of the draft declaration to the word "purposes." See The Declarationon the Protection
of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N.
Doc. A/10034 (1976).
44. See The Report Preparedby the Secretariaton the Fifth U.N. Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 56/10, at 38 (1976).
45. See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/39/L.63 (relates to the amendments to the draft resolution for the
adoption of the Convention contained in document A/C;3/39/L.40 (1984)).
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vention is clear evidence that the "severity" of the pain or suffering
is the essential ingredient for establishing that the conduct amounts
to torture. 46 The States during their deliberations on Article 1 of the
1978 Swedish Draft argued for the "requirement of severity" of the
pain or suffering as a result of the injurious governmental conduct.
The United States not only supported this position, it further requested the negotiating history of the Convention contain the requirement of "intensity" and "severity," which it argued was an inherent
47
aspect of torture.
Moreover, United States took the position that it was not necessary
for injurious conduct to result in the permanent impairment of physical
or mental faculties in order to be considered "severe." The impairment of physical or mental faculties is not an element of the crime of
torture, it is merely evidence of such crime. Britain, however, was
not comfortable with the utilization of the word "severe." It proposed
that "severe" be replaced by the word "extreme." The reasoning given
by Britain was that "severe" in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the
1978 Swedish Draft made its definition inconsistent with its second
paragraph, which is similar to Article 3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, endorsed by the European Court. 49 However, the
British proposal was not taken seriously.
There was little substantive discussion on the issue of what constitutes "severe" by the Working Group during the evolution of the

46. Leslie Raissman Wellbaum holds that "what raises certain tortuous injury to the level
of torture is its severity .
See Wellbaum, InternationalHuman Rights Claims after Tel
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic: Swan Song for the Legal Lohengrin?, 9 HAST. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 107, 127 (1985).
47. The European Commission in the Greek case noted that:
It appears from the testimony of a number of witnesses that a certain roughness
of treatment of detainees by both police and military authorities is tolerated by
most detainees and even taken for granted ....

This underlines the fact that the

point up to which prisoners and the public may accept physical violence as being
neither cruel nor excessive, varies between different societies and even between
different sections of them.
See Yearbook XII; The Greek Case, supra note 41, at 501.
48. See The Summary Prepared by the Secretary-Generalin Accordance with Commission
Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314, at 5 (1978) (contains the comments received
from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture, Commission on Human
Rights).
49. See Add. 1 of The Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General in Accordance with
Commission Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314 Add. 1, at 2 (1979) (contains
the comments received from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture,
Commission on Human Rights).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

15

Florida Journal of
International
Law, Vol. 5,LAW
Iss. JOURNAL
3 [1990], Art. 1
FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL

[Vol. 5

Convention? ° Neither did the States in their commentary on the Article
deal with the definition of "severe." However, the framers of the Draft
submitted by the International Association of Penal law at the thirtyfourth session of the Working Group did address the question. Although this draft was rejected by the Working Group, their deliberations resulted in perhaps the most useful formalization of this terminology. 5' "The scope of severe encompasses prolonged coercive or abusive
conduct, which in itself is not severe, but becomes so over a period
of time."52

Thus, for purposes of determining what constitutes "severe" under
the Convention on Torture, reference should be made to the above
definition and the test to be employed for doing so is a subjective one
according to the circumstances of each case.
4. Mental
What constitutes "mental suffering," or for that matter what is
included in such wording, was not debated by the Working Group and
remains unclear.
The German Democratic Republic commented that the wording
can be interpreted in many ways.5 Portugal proposed the inclusion
of the use of psychiatry in the definition of torture. It proposed a
third paragraph for that purpose which reads:5

50. For the text of this draft convention, see The Draft Conventionfor the Prevention and
Suppression of Torture: Submitted by the InternationalAssociation of Penal Law, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/NGO.213 (1978).
51. Article 2 of that Convention provides:
For the purposes of this Convention, torture is any conduct by which severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person by
or at the instigation of a public official or for which a public official is responsible
under Article 3, in order: (a) to obtain from that person or another person information or a statement or confession; or (b) to intimidate, discredit or humiliate that
person or another person; or (c) to inflict punishment on that person or another
person, save where such conduct is in a proper execution of a lawful sanction not
constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
52. Bassiouni, Commentary on the Draft Convention for the Prevention and Suppression

of Torture of the InternationalAssociation of Penal Law, 48
DROIT PENAL, No. 3-4, at 282-94 (1978).

REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE

53. See Add.1 of The Summary Prepared by the Secretary General in Accordance with
Commission Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314 Add. 1, at 7 (1979) (contains
the comments received from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture,
Commission on Human Rights).
54. Id.
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3. For the purpose of the present convention, the use
of psychiatry for one of the objects referred to in paragraph
1 or the abuse of psychiatry with a view to prolonging the
confinement of any person subjected to a measure or penalty
involving deprivation of freedom shall be regarded as torture.
Barbados suggested that the definition be expanded to include the
application of more sophisticated weapons of torture such as the administration of "truth" drugs which do not produce apparent physical or
mental suffering.5 At the thirty-fifth session of the Working Group,
one delegation, who was not identified in the records of the legislative
history of the convention, expressed its doubts whether the term
"mental torture" is complete. For this delegation the term was not
clear enough for the purpose of criminal law of States. Britain agreed
that the concept is too ambiguous for the National Courts of States
57
to assess, especially when dealing with the motive of discrimination.
The fear of these States, however, is unfounded. U.N. Conventions
have consistently included the prohibition of "mental torture" within
the scope of the prohibition of torture,5 and the term can be, and has
been, defined with sufficient precision: "The infliction of mental suffering through the creation of state of anguish and stress by means other
than bodily assault." 59
B.

The Intention and Purpose of the Conduct

The conduct is prohibited when it "is intentionally inflicted on a
person ....
1. Intentionally
The term is clear and should not present difficulties in the interpretation of the Convention. The term however, serves a very important
function because it implies the exclusion of negligent conduct from the
application of Article 1. The question then becomes: when does a

55. Id. at 5.
56. See Report of the 1979 Working Group on the Draft Convention on Torture, 35 U.N.
Doe. E/CN.4/1347,
178-80, at 39 (1979) (contained in the Report of the Commission on Human
Rights).
57. See The Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/39/499, at 19 (1984) (contains
the comments of States on the Draft Convention Against Torture).
58. See U.N. Commentary, Chapter VI,
13, 31 (1955).
59. Op. Com., Nov. 5, 1969, Greek Case, YB XII, at 461; Op. Com., Jan. 25, 1976, Case
of Ireland v. United Kingdom, Y.B. XIX at 512.
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particular conduct cease to be considered merely negligence? There
is no reference to the question at any stage of the drafting of the
Convention. In many systems of law, however, "intent" is defined in
terms of "specific" and "general intent," and negligence is determined
by the reasonable standard under the circumstances. Thus, when a
State fails to provide food and water to prisoners in its custody and
is accused of torture by way of omission, such State would not be
able to escape liability by claiming that its conduct was not intentional
but merely negligent and outside the scope of Article 1.
"General intent" may be established from the nature of the conduct.
The responsibility of the State in this instance would depend on
whether the omission, according to the reasonable standard, is determined to be "simple negligence" or "gross negligence" in which the
"general intent" is presumed from the conduct. For the United States,
the utilization of other terms such as "deliberate" and "malicious" may
serve better functions in the definition and could replace the list of
purposes of torture contained in paragraph 1, since it is not meant to
be all inclusive.6 It therefore proposed that Article 1 should read:
1. For the purpose of the present Convention, the offense
of torture includes any act by which extremely severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is deliberately and
maliciously inflicted on a person by or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official.
The United States was the only country that was not satisfied with
the term "intentionally." No other State commented on it; it invited
no serious discussion from the Working Group and the United States'
proposal was not adopted.
2. Purpose
The conduct is prohibited when it is intentionally inflicted "for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing
him or a third person, or for any reason based on discriminationof
any kind ...
"

60. See Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General in Accordance with Commission
Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314, at 6 (1978) (contains the comments received
from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture, Commission on Human
Rights).
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At its thirty-fourth session the Working Group debated the purposes of torture contained in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the
1978 Swedish Draft. Some States supported the idea of the reference
to the purposes of torture, but others thought that this was done in
too restrictive a manner and therefore should be deleted. 61 The legislative history of the Convention of the session indicates that the list
of purposes was meant to be "indicative" rather than "all inclusive."
Britain in its comment on those purposes thought that the formula
was imprecise and expressed its preference for making the list of
purposes of torture to be rather exhaustive62 The Swiss were doubtful
whether the formula would cover the infliction of pain or suffering as
a result of a medical or scientific experimentation not required by the
state of the health of the individual. It therefore proposed that the
following should be inserted after the first sentence of paragraph 1:
"It [the term 'torture'] also means medical or scientific experiments
that are not justified by a person's state of health and serve no
therapeutic purpose."' Even though the Swiss proposal was consistent
with the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- and its travaux
preparatoires,6 it was not incorporated into the Convention.
At its thirty-fifth session, the Working Group again debated the
question of whether the Article should specify the purposes of torture.
Some delegations suggested that it would be unduly restrictive to
specify any purposes at all. Others, however, considered the list of
purposes of torture contained in the Article to be indicative rather
than all-inclusive.6 Consequently, they supported the retention of the

61. See Report of the 1978 Working Group on the Draft, Convention on Torture, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/L. 1400, at 31 (1978).
62. See Add. 1 of the Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General in Accordance with
Commission Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314, Add. 1, at 2 (1979) (contains
the comments received from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture,
Commission on Human Rights).
63. See Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General in Accordance with Commission
Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314, at 8 (1978) (contains the comments received
from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture, Commission on Human
Rights).
64. Article 7 of the Covenant reads: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation involving risk, where such is not required
by his state of physical or mental health." See also P. VAN DIJK & G. VAN HOOF, THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1984).
65. U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/2929, at 32 (1955).
66. See Report of the 1979 Working Group on the Draft Convention on Torture, 35 U.N.
178-180, at 38 (1979) (contained in the Report of the Commission on
Doc. E/CN.4/1347,
Human Rights).
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list in the Article, which was extended to include as torture such acts
as the infliction of severe pain and suffering for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind.
The British Representative, however, was unhappy with the words
of "or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind." For him
the inclusion of the motivation of discrimination in the list of purposes
of torture was unnecessary and poses certain difficulties in its determination in a criminal offense before the courts of States. 67 Consequently, he requested that the following statement be included in
the negotiating history of the Convention:
The United Kingdom shares the concern to eliminate all
forms of torture, including any motivated by discrimination.
The United Kingdom is doubtful of the need to isolate this
particular motivation and in practical terms the United Kingdom thinks that there will in any case be difficulties in doing
so with the necessary degree of precision for a criminal offense.
In the debates of the text of the U.N. Declaration on Torture,
which is the edifice upon which the Convention on Torture was built,
a proposal was made for adding the words "or for any other purpose,"
after "or other persons" but it was defeated.6 The use of these words
in this Convention would have given it added strength. During the
consideration of the Convention by the General Assembly, for its adoption in 1984, the United States took the view that the definition of torture in Article 1 should be understood to apply not only to the specific
purposes mentioned in the definition, but also to any purpose or motive
regardless of whether it was mentioned in Article 1.69 Britain, however, expressed its preference for the inclusion of the concept of
"gratuitous torture," a known phenomenon in the list of the purposes
of torture. 70
C.

The Identity of the Offender

The conduct is prohibited: "when such pain or suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity ...
"
67. Id. at 39.
68. See The Report Preparedby the Secretariaton the Fifth U.N. Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 56/10, at 40 (1976).
69. See Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/39/499, at 21 (1984) (contains the
comments of States on the Draft Convention Against Torture).
70. Id. at 19.
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With respect to the description of the person whose conduct was
to be regulated, the delegations at the thirty-fourth session took different views. Some argued that the Article should apply to both public
officials and private individuals. Others contended that acts of torture
committed by private persons are not so serious as those inflicted by
governments and thus should not be included in the application of the
Article.71 No agreement was reached on this subject at this stage.
The issue was raised again in the Third Committee of the General
Assembly during its discussion of the Convention in 1978. The French
Representative insisted that the Convention should mention the question of torture by private individuals.72 The Director of the U.N.'s
Division of Human Rights also brought to the attention of the Committee the existence of institutions in certain countries which provide
instruction on torture methods, and recommend that the problem
might require further consideration by the Committee.7
During the discussion of the Working Group at the thirty-fifth
session, some representatives took the position that the scope of the
Convention and the definition of torture should not be limited to a
"public official." They proposed that the Convention should apply to
all individuals under the jurisdiction of the contracting States, regardless of their status. Others insisted that the acts of individuals, other
than public officials, would be more appropriately covered by the laws
of individual nations. For these representatives, the Convention on
Torture was intended to deal only with situations where national remedies are not likely to be provided. 74 The records of the drafting of
the Convention, however, do not reveal the identity of representatives
who put forward this argument.
The Working Group, however, was in a position to reach agreement
on the expansion of the definition of acts committed by a public official.
It agreed explicitly that the definition should include "acts committed
by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or any other person acting in an official capacity. ' ' 75 But

71. See Report of the 1978 Working Group on the Draft Convention on Torture, U.N. Dc.
E/CN.4/L. 1400, at 31 (1978).
72. See The Summary Record of the 73rd Meeting of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/33/SR.73, at 2 (1978) (held on Dec. 8, 1978 and the Committee discussed the Reports of
the Secretary-General on the Question of Torture and the Draft Convention Against It).
73. Id.
74. See The Report of the 1979 Working Group on the Draft Convention on Torture, 35
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1347,
178-80, at 37 (1979) (contained in the Report of the Commission on
Human Rights).
75. Id.
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the Working Group failed to define the concept of "public official"
during this session, any differently than it had in the previous one.
During the debates in the General Assembly on the Convention in
1984, after the completion of its drafting by the Working Group,
Panama expressed its dissatisfaction with the description of the persons whose conduct was to be regulated by the Convention. It considered the language as limiting the definition of torture and the scope
of the application of the Convention. In Panama's opinion, the language
mentioned in Article 1 suggests that it did not apply to acts of torture
committed by an individual, civilian organization or pseudo-religious
sect.7- The legislative history of the Convention seems to concur with
that position.
The discussion of the Working Group on this question indicates
that the Convention was intended to cover only government involvement in torture. In the view of the government of Panama, however,
the prohibition of torture should not have been limited to public officials
since the purpose of the Convention is to eradicate any and all activities
which result in the violation of the physical and psychological integrity
77
of the individual.
The Spanish government concurred. It stated that it preferred the
scope of the Article and of the Convention to be broader and consistent
with: the 1975 Declaration of the Protection of All Persons From Being
Subjected to Torture7 s of the General Assembly; the 1969 International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,which provides for protection against bodily harm whether inflicted
by government officials or by any individual, group or institution;-°
and the draft convention of the International Association of Penal
Law, which was rejected by the Working Group on the Convention

76. See Add. 1 of the Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/39/499 Add. 1, at 11
(1984) (contains the comments of States on the Draft Convention Against Torture).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 12.
79. This Convention was opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, and entered into force Jan. 4,
1969. 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
80. Article 5 provides:
In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in Article 2 of this
Convention States parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of every one, without distinction
as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably
in the enjoyment of the following rights: (b) The right to security of person and
protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual, group or institution.
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on Torture and seems to leave room for the broader interpretation
that it applies to private individuals. Article 2 of that draft, dealing
with the definition of the prohibited conduct, used the words "inflicted
on a person by or at the instigation of a public official," 8' and Article
3 of that draft, which dealt with the responsibility for the commission
of the offense of torture, used the words "a person" rather than "a
public official." It reads:
A person is responsible for committing or instigating torture
when that person:
(a) personally engages in or participates in such conduct;
or
(b) assists, incites, solicits, commands or conspires with
others to commit torture; or
(c) being a public official, fails to take appropriate measures to prevent or suppress torture when such person has
knowledge or reasonable belief that torture has been or is
being committed and has the authority or is in a position to
take such measures.
Thus, the incorporation of the language of Article 5(b) of the Convention on Racial Discrimination or of the above draft in the definition
of the present Article 1 would have strengthened the Convention on
Torture. Resort to these conventions for the interpretation and development of this Convention is permissible and may even be necessary.
The process of borrowing in comparison between international and
regional instruments is extremely useful and can solve the difficult
problems that could not be settled in the drafting stage of this convention.
1. Instigation
The term "instigation" means incitement, inducement or solicitation, and as such it requires the direct or indirect involvement and
participation of the public official in the act of torture in order to give
rise to state responsibility and the application of the Article. The
concept did not include the omission or failure of a public official to
act when he had reasonable grounds to believe that torture has or is
being committed. For this reason the United States suggested the
concept of "acquiescence" of a public official rather than "instigation
by," and proposed the insertion of the words "or with the consent or

81.

For the text of this article, see supra note 51.
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acquiescence" after "at the instigation of.'" The United States considered the concept of instigation as limiting the application of the definition of torture. It was the only country that commented on the term.
The proposal was adopted without comment.
2. Public Official
During its thirty-fourth session, the Working Group, despite
lengthy discussion, was unable to decide upon a definition of the term
"public official." Britain suggested the insertion of the phrase "or any
other agent of the state" after "public official" in order to clarify the
concept.8 Austria took the position that the concept of "public official"
'
could be expanded to include "persons acting in an official capacity. "
But both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany
proposed that the term "public official" be defined. Moreover, the
United States proposed an amendment in the form of a new Article
for defining the concept and the conditions under which a public official
would be liable for the commission of torture. The United States
draft Article read:
1. A public official is any person vested with the exercise
of some official power of the state, either civil or military.
2. Any public official who (a) consents to an act of torture, (b) assists, incites, solicits, commands, or conspires
with others to commit torture, or (c) fails to'take appropriate
measures to prevent or suppress torture when such person
has knowledge or should have knowledge that torture has
or is being committed and has the authority or is in a position
to take such measures, also commits the offense of torture
within the meaning of this Convention.

82. See Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General in Accordance with Commission
Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314, at 6 (1978) (contains the comments received
from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture, Commission on Human
Rights).
, 83. See Add. 1 of the Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General in Accordance with
Commission Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN4/1314 Add. 1, at 2 (1979) (contains
the comments received from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture,
Commission on Human Rights).
84. See The Summary Prepared by the Secretary-Generalin Accordance with Commission
Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314, at 9 (1978) (contains the comments received
from' Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture, Commission on Human
Rights).
85. Id.
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The German proposal was broader, covering a wide range of cases
and extending to individuals outside the government.
The Federal Government felt that, in particular, it should
be made clear that the term public official contained in paragraph 1 refers not only to persons who, regardless of their
legal status, have been assigned public authority by state
organs on a permanent basis or in an individual case, but
also to persons who, in certain regions or under particular
conditions, actually hold and exercise authority over others
and whose authority is comparable to government authority
or - be it only temporarily - has replaced government
authority or whose authority has been derived from the
aforementioned persons.m
But these proposals were not incorporated in the Convention on Torture by the Working Group.
D.

The Exclusion of Conduct Inherent In or Incidental To Lawful
Sanctions from the Definition of Article 1

The prohibition of torture in Article 1 "does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions."
The words "inherent in or incidentalto lawful sanctions" are vague
and very broad. Without clarification there is a danger that an extensive interpretation of these words would render the Convention impotent.
1. Inherent In or Incidental To
It is extremely difficult to determine what sanctions are and what
are not "inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions" in a particular
legal system. The Working Group on the Convention neither provided
any criteria for making such a determination nor did it define terms.
But even if it could be done, the nature of the findings would so differ
from one legal system to another that they would give rise to serious
disputes among the parties to the Convention. The 1978 Swedish Draft,
even though it did not define this terminology, qualified its application
as being consistent with the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the

86. See Add. 2 of the Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General in Accordance with
Commission Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1314 Add. 2, at 2 (1979) (contains
the comments received from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture,
Commission on Human Rights).
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Treatment of Prisoners. But the reference to these rules in this draft
caused considerable discussion at the thirty-fourth session of the Working Group. It was suggested that the reference to such rules would
make the issue more complicated, for it would endow the rules with
a semblance of legal binding force. s7
The commentary of States on this draft took the same position.
Many States proposed that the reference be deleted." They reasoned
that these rules had been adopted by the General Assembly in the
form of recommendations, not internationally binding legal obligations.
For these States to refer to these rules in a legally binding convention
would confer upon the rules the character of legal binding force. The
Danish government simply proposed to amend the rules to read: "to
the extent consistent with international rules for the treatment of
' ' 89
persons deprived of their liberty.
As a result of the objections to the above-mentioned rules in that
draft Article, Sweden omitted reference to them and in 1979 drafted
Article 1 in its present form. But the limitation clause dealing with
"pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions" in this draft Article raised serious concern and considerable
discussion among the Members of the Working Group at the thirty-fifth
session.
Some representatives thought that the limitation clause was very
vague and broad and might result in the frustration of the spirit and
purpose of the Convention. They therefore proposed the reintroduction
of the Swedish proposal for reference to the Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners contained in the original draft. Several
delegations, speaking in support of this position, suggested the inclusion of a reference to "existing international standards" as the criteria
for determining the validity and applicability of the clause. Others
objected on the ground that the controversial rules were designed to
regulate only the conditions of imprisonment,9 and they pointed out
that these rules are not internationally binding.
87. See Report of the 1978 Working Group on the Draft Convention on Torture, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/L. 1400, at 31 (1978).
88. The states which proposed the deletion of the reference to the Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners were: Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German
Democratic Republic, Spain and the United States.
89. See Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General in Accordance with Commission
Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314, at 9 (1978) (contains the comments received
from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture, Commission on Human
Rights).
90. See Report on the 1979 Working Group on the Draft Convention on Torture, 35 U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1347,
178-80, at 38 (1979) (contains the Report of the Commission on Human
Rights).
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Finally, the Working Group decided against any reference to these
rules leaving the conduct of States "inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions" unclarified by any other international standards or limitations and subject only to their domestic laws and interpretation. There
is nothing in the records of the legislative history of the Convention
that indicates that the drafters had agreed on the application of any
international standards to such conduct of States. The language of the
present definition of torture in Article 1, which is the final expression
of the intent of the drafters, confirms this conclusion. Consequently,
under this definition, any State that is committed to the practice of
torture would be able to take its conduct outside the scope of the
Convention by making it a lawful sanction under its legal system of
government and argue that the conduct is "inherent in or incidental
to lawful sanctions" which are excluded from the definition of the
prohibited conduct.
The exclusion of the conduct "inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions" from the application of the Convention renders certain objective standards external to the legal systems of the Parties meaningless. The exclusion of the conduct "inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions" enables Parties to violate the Convention without being
found in breach of it. This glaring loophole is recognized by the U.N.
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities. Its study of the meaning and scope of requirements,
concepts and terms relating to limitation or restrictions on human
rights and fundamental freedoms has concluded that such terminology
as "determined by law,"91 "prescribed by law," "established by law,"or "provided by law," which are contained in many human rights
conventions - "unless qualified, would mean in effect that the State
would be able to avoid its international obligations in the matter by
'95
enacting laws limiting the individual's rights of freedoms.
To close this escape route, the definition should have retained the
reference to the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. The U.N. Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, in its

91. See art. 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and art. 4 of the Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
92. See art. 8(1)(C) of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (adopted Dec. 16,
1966, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
93. See art. 9(1) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
94. See art. 12(3) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
95. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Add. 2, at 1 (1979).
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review of these rules found that they exercised a significant influence
on the positive development of the laws and regulations of a great
number of countries and jurisdictions in the treatment of prisoners. 9
These Rules themselves comprehensively prohibit torture and other
mistreatment. Article 31 of the Rules stipulates that: "Corporal punishment, punishment by placing in a dark cell, and all cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishments shall be completely prohibited as punishments
for disciplinary offenses." Article 32(2) also states that: "The same
shall apply to any other punishment that may be prejudicial to the
physical or mental health of a prisoner."9
The retention of the rules in the limitation clause would have established some restraints on States in their interpretation of "inherent
in or incidental" to lawful sanctions.
2.

Lawful Sanctions

Although at first glance this term appears to be clear enough, in
fact its ambiguity poses difficult problems. The delegation of Uruguay,
at the fortieth session of the Working Group on the Convention, questioned the meaning of "lawful sanctions" that might cause pain or
suffering.9 8 Furthermore, the Canadian representative complained
about the ambiguity of "lawful sanctions. '"- For instance, what may
be lawful in one legal system may not be so in another. The amputation
of a hand for the offense of theft is "lawful" in some Arab States who
follow the traditions of Islamic Law, but is not in others and in the
rest of the world. Thus, if states are allowed exclusively to employ
their national legal standards to determine "lawful sanctions" exceptions, the result may be the justification of torture that the Convention
is intended to prohibit. These deviant practices underscore the urgent
need for a uniform definition of "lawful sanctions" on the international
plane.

96. U.N. Doc. E/CN.5/536, at 16 (1976).
97. Adopted Aug. 30, 1955 by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. U.N. Doc. A/CONF./6/1, Annex 1, at A (1956) (Adopted
July 31, 1957 by Economic and Social Council). E.S.C. Res. 663 (XXIV)C, 24 U.N. ESCOR
Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957).
98. See The Draft Convention Against Torture, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/SR/33, at 10 (1984)
(Summary Record of the 33rd Meeting of the Commission on Human Rights in which the
Working Group and other various representatives had commented on the provisions of the
Convention).
99. See The Report on the 1984 Open-Ended Working Group on the Draft Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1984/L.2 (1984); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72, at 7 (1984).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol5/iss3/1

28

Boulesbaa: AnalysisU.N.
andCONVENTION
Proposals forONthe
Rectification of the Ambiguities I
TORTURE

In recognition of this need, many States argued for the clarification
of the exception. While it was important for the United States to
retain the exception of lawful sanctions from the application of the
Convention in order to dispel the fears of the States that the Convention might encroach on their criminal law, it was equally important
to clarify the exception. It therefore proposed that the exception of
lawful sanctions should be made inapplicable when such sanctions were
imposed in flagrant disregard of accepted international standards. For
example, as noted by the United States, Article 2 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and Article 75(4) of Protocol 1 to the
1949 Geneva Conventions apply the exception in this manner. 1' °
Belgium took the position that the concept of lawful sanctions is
ambiguous and as such, provides an escape clause for the States Par° It would have preferred the concept of lawful sanctions to be
ties. 10
worded differently. Nevertheless, it accepted the Convention as submitted to the United Nations General Assembly. Britain, Italy and
the Netherlands took the view that the expression of "lawful sanctions"
must be interpreted as reflecting commonly accepted international
legal standards. °2 In other words, the domestic law of States must
conform to international law for the purpose of this Convention. The
Western position on this point is supported by Western scholars in
the field of human rights. Paul Sieghart, for instance, has argued that:
"What is needed for the resolution of such problems is a universal
standard of legitimacy against which all laws can be tested anywhere
on our planet regardless of the local constitution, religion or culture."' °The failure of the Working Group on the Convention to grapple with
these problems and to specify the standards or the qualifications for
determining the legitimacy of "lawful sanction" is regrettable. The
General Assembly in its request to the Commission on Human Rights

100. The Four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and this Protocol, however, apply
only to international armed conflict. Article 3 of this Protocol reads: "This Protocol, which
supplements the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of war victims, shall
apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions." Article 2(b) of
the same Protocol reads: "Rules of international law applicable in armed conflict means the rules
applicable in armed conflict set forth in international agreements to which the parties to the
conflict are parties and the generally recognized principles and rules of international law which
are applicable to armed conflict." The Second Protocol to the above Conventions, however, is
intended for the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.
101. See Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/39/499, at 4 (1984) (contains the
comments of States on the Draft Convention Against Torture).
102. Id. at 11, 13 & 19.
103. Sieghart, Professions as the Conscience of Society, 11 J. MED. ETH. 121 (1985).
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to draft the Convention, expressly demanded that the Convention
include the principles of the Declaration on Torture, which contains a
reference to the Standard Minimum Rules.- Even if the objection to
these Rules is valid, some other mechanism should have been created
to limit the human rights abuses of States which hide behind the
lawful sanctions exception. Paragraph 2 of the United States Alternative Proposal to Article 1 of the 1978 Swedish Draft, could have made
an important contribution to solving this problem. It reads: "2. Torture
does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to sanctions lawfully imposed: but does not include sanctions
imposed under color of
law but in flagrant disregard of accepted inter10 5°
standards.'
national
There are certain standards for the protection of human rights set
forth in the various international instruments which require States
not to impair their international obligations by invoking their municipal
laws. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the extent that
it reflects customary international law, contains the international
standards to be followed by States in this respect. It represents an
authoritative interpretation, which is binding on States, of the international law of human rights which prohibits States from denying its
protection to their citizens.- °
An additional source for international norms is also illuminating.
The International Labor Organization System not only has effectively
dealt with the "lawful sanctions" questions, it also provides the answer
to the problem. Article 8 of Convention (No. 87) concerning Freedom

104. See Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. No. 32/62 (1977), 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 137, U.N.
Doc. A/32/45, at 137 (1978) (requesting the Commission on Human Rights to draw up the
Convention on Torture).
105. See Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General in Accordance with Commission
Resolution 18 (XXXIV), 35 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314, at 6 (1978) (contains the comments received
from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture, Commission on Human
Rights).
106. Professor Sohn has argued that: "In a relatively short time the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights has thus become a part of the constitutional law of the world community; and
together with the Charter of the U.N., it has achieved the character of a world law superior
to all other international instruments and to domestic law." Sohn, The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement, 8 J. INT'L COMM. JUR. No. 2, 17,
25-26 (1967). Prof. R. Jennings also takes the position that "the Universal Declaration is certainly
not without some legal efficacy." See Jennings, Recent Developments in the InternationalLaw
Commission: Its Relation to the Sources of InternationalLaw, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 385,
504 (1964). See also N. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAw 60, n.53 (1987).
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of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize has closed this
escape route to States who attempt to evade the Convention's obligations. Article 8 states that:
in exercising the rights provided for in this Convention workers and employers and their respective organizations, like
other persons or organized collectivities, shall respect the
law of the land. The law of the land shall not be such as to
impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, the guarantees
provided for in this Convention.107
Therefore, when these standards are violated, the offending States
are held liable on the international plane even if their conduct is lawful
according to their legal system. The standards applicable to exceptions
to the Convention on Torture should, in light of ILO norms, be the
same as those which operate elsewhere on the international plane.
IV.

THE OVERBREADTH OF THE DEFINITION OF TORTURE IN

ARTICLE 1
The Definition is not completely satisfactory. 108 It is vague and
loose, thus making it easy for States to evade the Convention. The
British Representative to the Working Group on the Convention argued that "a vague definition would only make implementation of the
Convention less effective.'1 °
The argument that the definition of Article 1 is vague and unsatisfactory does not mean that the Convention is without any potential
for success. If some of the problems identified here are corrected, the
Convention has great potential to fulfill the developing aspirations of
our rapidly changing world community. The vagueness of the definition
can be resolved by recourse to regional and international instruments
that contain comparable definitions of the prohibited conduct. The
European Commission on Human Rights has rendered the following
interpretation of the counterpart Article in the ECHR:

107. For the text of the Convention and the Article, see International Labour Organization,
Conventions and Recommendations Adopted by the International Labour Conference 1919-1966,
Geneva, International Labour Office (1966).
108. Boulesbaa, An Analysis of the 1984 Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment, 4 DICK. J. INT'L L. 185, at 189 (1986).
109. See Draft Convention Against Torture, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/SR/33, at 8 (1984)
(Summary Record of the 33rd Meeting of the Commission on Human Rights in which the
Working Group, and other various representatives had commented on the provisions of the
Convention).
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It is plain that there may be treatment to which all these
descriptions [in Article 3] apply, for all torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman treatment
also degrading. The notion of inhuman treatment covers at
least such treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering,
mental or physical, which in the particular situation, is unjustifiable. The word "torture" is often used to describe inhuman
treatment, which has a purpose, such as the obtaining of
information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment,
and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment.
Treatment or punishment of individual may be said to be
degrading if it grossly humiliates him before others or drives
him to act against his will or conscience. 110
Article 2 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture signed on December 9, 1985, is very enlightening in relation
to the U.N. Torture Convention. It reads:
For the purpose of this convention, torture shall be understood to be any act intentionally performed whereby physical
or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation,
as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose. Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to
obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his
physical pain or mental pain or suffering that is inherent in
or solely the consequence of lawful measures, provided that
they do not include the performance of the acts or use the
methods referred to in this Article.11
These definitions are certainly helpful to the definition of the prohibited conduct of the Convention and can serve to illuminate the gaps
created by the process of compromise and consensus which transpired
during the drafting of the Convention.
V.

THE SAVING CLAUSE AGAINST THE WEAKENING OF OTHER
CONVENTIONS AND NATIONAL LAWS OF STATES

Article 1(2) reads: "This Article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain
provisions of wider application."

110. Op. Com., Nov. 5, 1969, Greek Case, supra note 41, at 186 (emphasis added).
111. Official Doc. OEA/Ser. A/42 (SEPF) (1986).
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A.

Does or May Contain Provisions of Wider Application

There was no substantial discussion on the wording of this paragraph. However, this does not present serious problems as the paragraph is unlikely to give rise to difficulties. This paragraph is a saving
clause against the weakening of existing international conventions and
national laws of States, which may have wider application or definition
than the Convention on Torture. It was first introduced in the version
proposed by the delegation of Sweden at the pre-sessional discussions
of the thirty-fifth session. However, that version which contained the
words "established wider prohibition" after the words "does or may,"
differed from the current version.112 The Revised Swedish Draft replaced the word "establish" with the word "contain," and added the
words "provisions of wider application" relating to the subject matter
of this Convention." 3 This draft was adopted by consensus at this
session. The next time the paragraph was reconsidered it was decided
to change the terms "national legislation" to "national law" in order
to make the paragraph consistent with paragraph 2 of Article 16,
which contained a similar saving clause"1 using the same terms. The
paragraph as adopted at the thirty-seventh session reads: "This Article
is without prejudice to any international instrument or national law
which does or may contain provisions of wider application."
The records of the thirty-eighth 15 session of the discussions of the
Working Group on the Conventions do not contain any further debates
on the paragraph. The text of the paragraph, however, as it appears
in the annex to the records of that session" 6 and in the present Article
contains the words "national legislation" in their early form. This may
well have been an error since there appears to have been a deliberate
attempt to bring the paragraph into line with paragraph 2 of Article 16.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The definition covers only international government conduct. It
does not cover negligence of the government, nor does it apply to

112. See Report of the 1979 Working Group on the Draft Convention on Torture, 35 U.N.
178-80, at 37 (1979) (contains the Report of the Commission on Human
Doc. E/CN.4/1347,
Rights).
113. Id. at 39.
114. See Report of the 1981 Working Group, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L. 1576 (1981); Commission
on Human Rights Report on the Thirty-Seventh Session, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 50,
U.N. Doc. E/1981/25 (1981), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1475, at 53 (1981).
115. See Report of the 1982 Working Group, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982 L/40 (1982) (the text
is reproduced in an addendum, U.N. Doc. E/1982/12/Add. 1, at 3 (1982)).
116. Id. at 19.
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private individuals not acting on behalf of the government. Such features of the definition clearly limit the scope and effectiveness of the
Convention. The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination provided for protection against bodily
harm whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual,
group or institution. The draft Convention of the International Association of Penal Law which was rejected by the Working Group on
the Convention seems to leave room for the interpretation that it
applies to private individuals. Thus, the incorporation of the language
of the above-mentioned Conventions would strengthen the Convention
on Torture and the task for improving the Convention requires the
persuasion of States to accept the commitments provided for in these
conventions.
Furthermore, the definition of the Article did not spell out what
constitutes "inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions" which are
excluded from the application of the Convention. Consequently, under
this definition any State that is engaged in the practice of torture
would be able to shield its conduct from the scope of the Conventions
by making it a lawful sanction under its legal system of government
and argue that lawful sanctions are excluded from the definition of
the prohibited conduct. The exclusion of lawful sanctions from the
application of the Convention is not requiredito be consistent with
certain objective standards external to the legal systems of the Parties.
The exclusion of lawful sanctions therefore enables Parties to violate
the Convention without being found in breach of it. To close this
escape route, the definition should have retained the language borrowed from the U.N. Declaration on Torture. This declaration has
specified the criteria to be employed for the exclusion of acts of pain
or suffering which are "inherent in or incidental to lawful sanction,"
from the application of the declaration by requiring that such acts
must be consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
The failure to grapple with these problems is regrettable and represents an impediment to the success of the Convention. It is, therefore, necessary to search for solutions to these problems; that, indeed,
is what this commentary has undertaken to achieve. The conclusion
of this analysis is that the resolution of some of the difficult problems
embedded in the U.N. Convention on Torture lies in the international
standard at hand, contained in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, regional standards and the applicable norms of the International Labor Organization System.
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